16 Under the 2014 Protocol, the material jurisdiction of the Tribunal has been confined to the 'interpretation of the SADC Treaty and Protocol' (Art 33). This in particular means that the yet to be reconstituted Tribunal will not have jurisdiction over disputes that arise from acts of the SADC institutions.
Personal Jurisdiction
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The SADC Tribunal has a broad personal jurisdiction. The provisions governing the Tribunal's personal jurisdiction are set forth in Articles 15, 17, 18, and 19 2000 Protocol. According to these articles, the Tribunal has jurisdiction over disputes between: (i) Member States (Art 15 (1) 19 Moreover, it is worth noting that there is no requirement for natural or legal persons to have a legal interest in the subject matter of the dispute as a prerequisite for initiating a dispute before the Tribunal against the Member States or the SADC. As far as individual access to the Tribunal is concerned, the only requirement is related to the exhaustion of local remedies. In this regard, (1)).
29 Upon receipt of an application or notification of a special agreement by one of the parties, the Registrar shall communicate a certified copy of the application or notification to the respondent (1)). Under certain circumstances, the President may order that the case is given priority over others or defer a case to be dealt with at a later date (Rule 43).
32 Oral proceedings shall be held at the seat of the Tribunal in Windhoek, Namibia, but the Tribunal may decide (if it considers it desirable) that all or part of proceedings in a case shall be held at a place other than the seat of the Tribunal (Rule 44). Proceedings before the SADC Tribunal shall be held in public unless the Tribunal otherwise directs either on its own motion or by the application of any of the parties to conduct the whole or part of the hearing in camera (Rule 45).
The President of the Tribunal shall declare the proceedings closed after both parties have completed their submissions (Rule 53). The Tribunal may however order the resumption of the oral proceedings after hearing the parties (Rule 55). 34 The majority system and the fact that each judge has to give her/his decision in writing implies that dissenting opinions are possible. However, the publication of such opinions is neither explicitly permitted nor prohibited under the rules of procedure. In practice, for example, the dissenting opinion of Justice Tshosa in the Campbell case is widely circulated on the internet.
Deliberations and Decisions of the Tribunal
However, his opinion was not issued as part of the majority decision. Nor were there any indications that his opinion was published by the Tribunal. establishes the existence of such failure, it shall report its finding to the Summit for the latter to take appropriate action'. As will be discussed further below, the Tribunal repeatedly referred Zimbabwe's failure to comply with its decisions in the Campbell case to the Summit, but no action was taken by the latter against Zimbabwe. According to Zimbabwe, the effect of the amendment to Article 16 (2) SADC Treaty is simply to elevate the status 2000 Protocol (unlike other SADC protocols), but not to make it enforceable.
However, this argument was found to be untenable for two reasons. First, given that the 61 In contrast to Kenya and the Gambia, Zimbabwe was able to successfully cripple the SADC Tribunal, if not destroy it altogether. This is due in part to the combination of the following two factors, which appears to be at the heart of the SADC Tribunal's (ongoing) saga: tensions between politics and the rule of law, and ambiguities and vagueness in SADC legal instruments.
62 To a large extent, the fate of the SADC Tribunal was determined by the primacy of politics over the rule of law in the SADC. The tension between politics and the rule of law manifested itself on two levels: first, when Zimbabwe refused to comply with the rulings of the Tribunal; and second, when the Summit decided to suspend the Tribunal instead of sanctioning Zimbabwe for noncompliance.
63 As noted by the Tribunal in the Campbell case, SADC is an international organization. The rules set out in the SADC Treaty and other subsidiary legal instruments adopted by the SADC Member
States have the status of international law. Despite the legal complications, the SADC Tribunal was legally constituted in accordance with these rules. Even a Zimbabwean court has confirmed this. It follows that Zimbabwe's refusal to comply with the decisions of the SADC Tribunal is a plain breach of international law. For Zimbabwe and President Mugabe, in particular, however, the costs of violating international law were outweighed by the political benefits of maintaining his signature land redistribution program.
64 The rest of the SADC Membership had the chance to tilt the balance in favour of the rule of law. However, in failing to take action against Zimbabwe, SADC Member States chose to close ranks with Mugabe at the expense of the regional rule of law. At least two political considerations explain their decision to stand in solidarity with Mugabe instead of standing up for the rules and procedures they set out to govern their conduct. The first one is well-captured in a remark made by the former Tanzanian president, Jakaya Kikwete, who lamented to his fellow SADC Heads of 
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State that, in creating the SADC Tribunal, 'we have created a monster that will devour us all' (Christie, 2011) . His remark clearly shows that in creating the SADC Tribunal with such a broad jurisdiction, SADC Member States did not think through the repercussions of their action. For SADC Members with poor human right records, the Campbell case was a wake-up call to realize the dangers of the 'monster'. Therefore, it is no surprise that Mugabe faced little resistance from such countries in his mission to dismantle the Tribunal. However, given their relatively better human rights record and political capital within the SADC, one would have expected the likes of Botswana, Namibia, and South Africa to stop Mugabe from dismantling the Tribunal.
65
The second political consideration is that at the early stage of the SADC Tribunal saga, SADC Member States were busy trying to broker a power-sharing agreement in Zimbabwe following the disputed outcome of the 2008 election. It seems that the SADC Member States were reluctant to sanction Zimbabwe in order not to undermine the chance of Mugabe agreeing to the power-sharing deal. A typical example of how political solidarity with Mugabe took priority over the regional rule of law is the 30th SADC Summit, which was supposed to sanction Zimbabwe for being defiant but concluded by issuing a call for the lifting of international sanctions on Zimbabwe. Unfortunately, the suspension of the SADC Tribunal is a symbol of the triumph of politics over the rule of law in the SADC.
66 Another equally significant element to the SADC Tribunal saga is the inconsistencies and ambiguities in the SADC legal instruments. As indicated in the preceding sections, the SADC legal instruments are awash with ambiguities and evasiveness. This is largely caused by inept legal drafting. Zimbabwe used this lack of clarity in SADC legal instruments to the fullest in diverting attention from its blatant non-compliance to questions over the legal existence of the Tribunal.
Zimbabwe would not have been able to cast doubt and create confusion over the legal existence of the Tribunal if the legal instruments were clear. Unfortunately, these problems seem to haunt the Tribunal to this day. As an integral part of the SADC Treaty, the 2000 Protocol can only be amended or repealed through the amendment procedure set forth in Article 36 SADC Treaty.
As already noted, Article 36 requires only a signature by two-thirds of the SADC Member States.
This means that as an amendment to the SADC Treaty, the 2014 Protocol shall enter into force when it is signed by ten of the fifteen SADC Member States. So far, the 2014 Protocol has been signed by nine of the fifteen Member States. Strictly speaking, the 2014 Protocol requires a signature of one more SADC Member State to enter into force. But, absurdly enough, the 2014
Protocol contains a ratification requirement, which is confusing at best and contradictory at worst. 
